Analysis: Navy Vulnerable to Cruise Missiles

Christopher W. Holton
Wednesday, July 19, 2000

The General Accounting Office has released a report concluding that our Navy is
growing more vulnerable every day to anti-ship cruise missile attacks. The July 11
report, “Comprehensive Strategy Needed to Improve Ship Cruise Missile Defenses,”
surely comes as no surprise to anyone familiar with defense and maritime issues.

It doesn?t take a rocket scientist to understand this vulnerability, and the GAO?s
58-page report could probably have been written in five pages or less by anyone
who has served in the U.S. Navy over the past decade.

Seven Years of Downsizing and Neglect, or,
‘Sorry, Paul, Peter Is Out of Money’

During the years of the Clinton administration, the U.S. fleet?s ability to defend itself
against anti-ship cruise missiles has been frozen in time in some aspects and
degraded in other aspects. During this seven-year period, not one new weapon
system has been added to the inventory to defend against cruise missile attack.

Sure, a few systems that were developed and ordered during the Reagan and Bush
administrations came on line during the early Clinton years (AEGIS Vertical Launch
System, Rolling Airframe Missile, or RAM), but no new items have been added in
seven years.

Meanwhile, the threat has been growing.

Cruise Missiles: The Forgotten Threat

When the Royal Navy?s HMS Sheffield and the U.S. Navy?s U.S.S. Stark were struck
with Exocet cruise missiles in the 1980s, there was a high degree of awareness of
the anti-ship missile threat. Today, the focus has shifted to the dangerous ballistic
missile threat.

But proliferation of cruise missiles is a serious threat also. Here is a list of some of
the countries that have armed themselves with modern anti-ship missiles:

Iran

Iraq

Red China

North Korea

Russia

Libya

Cuba

And the cruise missiles are getting faster and harder to hit. According to Great
Britain?s authoritative Center for Defense and International Security Studies
(CDISS), Russia, Red China and Iran are all believed to possess Russia?s Sunburn
anti-ship missile, with its large payload (1,000 pounds or more) and Mach 2.5 speed
(1,650 mph) at just above sea level.

This threat is in another world from the Exocet that struck the Sheffield in 1983,
which carried a 250-pound warhead at a speed of 500 mph.

With these three countries in possession of such a weapon, you can be sure that
countries such as North Korea, Iraq and Libya will start asking for the same thing.
All they need to get the Sunburn is money.

There are more countries with more anti-ship cruise missiles around the world in
2000. Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy?s ability to defend itself against this threat was
arguably greater back in 1991, before Bill Clinton got elected, than it is today.

Defense in Depth

The U.S. Navy?s strategy for defense against anti-ship missiles has always been
based on “defense in depth.” That defense in depth was composed of five rings:

The first ring was manned by the E-2C Hawkeye Airborne Early Warning and
Control (AEW&C) aircraft operating in tandem with the F-14 Tomcat armed with
AIM-54C Phoenix air-to-air missiles.

The E-2C, operating 100 miles or so from the carrier battle group, can detect
threats out another 200-300 miles at altitudes from near sea level all the way to
100,000 feet. The E-2 can detect aircraft and ships long before they get close
enough to the carrier to launch a missile (anti-ship missiles have ranges up to about
185 miles).

It can also detect missiles launched from submerged submarines, after the missile
breaks the surface. This information is transferred to the F-14 Tomcat. The
Tomcat?s powerful radar can track 24 targets simultaneously and guide Phoenix
missiles to six of them (the last 10 miles or so, the Phoenix guides itself with its own
radar). The Phoenix is big enough to knock a strategic bomber out of the sky and
smart enough and fast enough to knock a Sunburn down.

The first ring is aging and close to becoming extinct. The E-2C has been around
since the early 1980s. It has received some upgrades, but its radar and systems
are still basically the same.

Potential adversaries have had 20 years to study the E-2C and develop ways to get
around it. The F-14 Tomcat is one of the tragic stories of naval aviation. Its latest
version, the F-14D, is arguably the world’s best fighter, but budget considerations
and politics ensured that few of these were built. The majority of Tomcats in service
are carrying the same radar and missiles they carried 20 years ago.

Worse yet, the Tomcat?s numbers are shrinking. Fifteen years ago, each carrier air
wing included 24 F-14s. Today?s carrier air wing has just 10. And those 10 are
overworked on other tasks, namely night attack and photo reconnaissance.

The Tomcat has to perform in the attack role because the Navy gave up its only
dedicated all-weather, night attack aircraft, the A-6 Intruder, several years ago,
without a replacement. The Fleet Air Defense role has been handed over to the
F/A-18 Hornet, a great dogfighter with very limited range and no long-range missile
like the Phoenix. (The F-18 enjoys the unique advantage of being built in the district
of Rep. Richard Gephardt, D-Mo. The F-14 could not compete with that.)

Speaking of the Phoenix, its numbers are also dwindling. The decision was made a
few years back to stop production and cancel upgrades. Once again, our naval
aviators are tasked with defending themselves against emerging threats using
decade-old technology.

The second ring consists of the very capable AEGIS missile defense system on
board the Ticonderoga-class cruisers and the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.

First envisioned during the Ford administration, the AEGIS can protect a task force
for hundreds of miles from the center of the group. This ring is the only ring still
intact, but AEGIS ships are expensive and thus not numerous. Should a submarine
sink an AEGIS-armed escort, the task force that escort is supposed to protect will
suddenly be very naked. The Navy has a lot of eggs in one basket here.

The third ring consists of the surface ships? own self-defense missiles, usually
the NATO Sea Sparrow, sometimes called the Improved Basic Point Defense
Missile System (IBPDMS).

The Sea Sparrow has a range of up to six miles, but, as the GAO points out, its
operational readiness is poor. In other words, the IBPDMS doesn?t work about as
much as it works. It is a relatively old system, designed in the late 1970s. Budgetary
considerations have delayed upgrades and extended deployments have overtaxed
maintenance schedules.

The fourth ring is made up of different electronic countermeasures, such as the
SLQ-32 electronic warfare system and the Super RBOC (Rapid Bloom Onboard
Chaff).

The SLQ-32 is designed to confuse incoming missiles, but, once again, as the GAO
reports, its operational availability is low. Once again, it is a 20-year-old system that
has not been upgraded, and deployment schedules during the Clinton
administration that have gone far beyond anyone?s wildest imagination have resulted
in maintenance shortfalls.

The Super RBOC is a system that shoots “chaff” (metal strips) into the sky to
decoy missile radar. It?s been around since the 1980s also.

The fifth and final ring consists of the “last ditch” weapons: the Vulcan/Phalanx
Close In Weapon System (CIWS) and the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM).

The CIWS is a radar-directed, six-barrel 20mm gun with a rate of fire of 4,000
rounds a minute. It is an effective weapon, but, once again, it is a 20-year-old
design, and it too has suffered from the Navy?s high operational tempo and resulting
maintenance problems.

The RAM is the newest defensive weapon in the arsenal. Developed in cooperation
with the West German Navy in the 1980s, the RAM entered production in early 1993
and has performed brilliantly in tests. However, its 21-tube launcher has only been
installed on a small number (27) of the Navy?s ships.

Conclusion: Seven Years of Neglect Have Left
Our Sailors and Marines in Danger

Today, rogue nations including Red China possess anti-ship missile capabilities
that far exceed the threat that existed in the late 1980s. Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy?s
ability to defend itself against these threats is less today than it was in 1990. The
Clinton-Gore administration has been asleep at the wheel.

Not only have potential adversaries such as China benefited from technology
transfers from the United States, they have enjoyed a “grace” period in which they
were able to exponentially increase their capabilities with no corresponding
increases in defense capability in the United Stateszq.

The Navy is almost totally dependent on the AEGIS defense system. Defense in
depth has become eroded. One of the five rings of defense has been allowed to die
on the vine. Three of the others are withering.

Those who will pay the price for this neglect do not reside in Washington, D.C. They
live and work on board our Navy?s ships. They are the young men and women we
ask to do that which no one else is willing to do: defend our country and our way of
life.

***

Christopher Holton is the president of Blanchard and Company and has been
writing about geopolitical issues, economics and defense topics for more than 10
years. He can be reached at [email protected]