(NC) Self-defense law to get trial run 02-22-04

Address:http://www.heraldsun.com/durham/4-450305.html

1993 law to get trial run in Durham

By John Stevenson : The Herald-Sun
[email protected]
Feb 22, 2004 : 9:43 pm ET

DURHAM — Eleven years ago, the highly publicized Durham trial of
Michael Seagroves underscored the need for greater clarity about how far
homeowners might legally go to protect their property.

Seagroves was charged with fatally shooting one teen and wounding
another after they broke into his Woodcroft garage to steal a
motorcycle. He said he was defending not only his home, but also the
physical wellbeing of himself and his infant son.

As it turned out, jurors were unable to reach a unanimous verdict in
four days of deliberations.

Eight of 12 panelists, it was revealed, believed that Seagroves acted in
self-defense and did not use excessive force when confronted by the
teens.

“Mr. Seagroves had no idea where the men were going,” one juror later
told The Herald-Sun. “If I were in that position, I would have
[interpreted] it as a physical assault. They may not have touched him,
but the threat was there. … My belief is that the threat really wasn’t
gone until [the intruders] were out of the garage.”

Four jurors disagreed, however.

Because of the lack of unanimity, a mistrial was declared. Manslaughter
and assault charges against Seagroves ultimately were dismissed.

Then the Legislature went to work, attempting to provide better guidance
for homeowners and juries in such cases.

General Statute 14-51.1 on the “use of deadly physical force against an
intruder” was enacted not long after the Seagroves mistrial. It holds
that a homeowner or tenant may use “any degree of force,” including
deadly force, to prevent forcible entry into a residence or oust an
intruder.

Under the law, homeowners may use such force only when they reasonably
believe an intruder intends to kill or harm someone or commit another
felony.

“A lawful occupant within a home or other place of residence does not
have a duty to retreat from an intruder,” the law states.

Before 1993, such concepts existed only in common law. The Seagroves
case propelled them to codification in what is commonly known as the
“defense-of-habitation” statute.

Now, the 10-year-old law is about to be used in Durham for reportedly
the first time since its enactment.

Public Defender Bob Brown is expected to bring it up this week when
Kennis Thaxton goes on trial for second-degree murder in the June 2002
slaying of a man who allegedly invaded his apartment on Hardee Street.

The victim, 18-year-old Abdullah Ali Helms, was shot twice in the back.
Another alleged intruder, Donnell Wilder, was wounded and reportedly
will testify for the prosecution.

Thaxton himself was shot in the leg.

Evidence is expected to show that Thaxton anticipated a home invasion
and alerted police a few days earlier.

Brown said he was prohibited by judicial rules from discussing the case.
However, he laid out some of his theories in a written court motion two
weeks ago.

Thaxton was “attacked in his own home by armed drug dealers,” the motion
says. Helms and Wilder “forcibly entered the home … in order to extort
money and other property,” it adds.

“This would go to show that the actions of [Thaxton] were reasonable
under the circumstances and … were justified under the law of
self-defense,” according to the motion.

Like Brown, prosecutor Tracey Cline told The Herald-Sun she could not
discuss the case. But she did not deny that drugs and money may have
fueled the shootings.

In his attempt to exonerate Thaxton, Brown reportedly will use the
relatively new defense-of-habitation statute in addition to the
traditional law of self-defense, which holds that a person may use
reasonable, but not excessive, force to protect himself against death or
great bodily harm.

The jury’s decision is not expected to be easy.

Three times during the lengthy Seagroves deliberations 11 years ago,
jurors informed Judge J.B. Allen they were confused by such legal
phrases as “excessive force” and “defense of habitation.”

Allen told the jury, among other things, that Seagroves would be
entirely excused under the law if he believed it was necessary to fire
his .22-caliber rifle “to save himself from death or great bodily harm.”

Jurors should consider whether a “person of ordinary firmness” might
have feared for his life under the circumstances, the judge added.

Allen also instructed jurors that people in such situations were not
required to “calibrate with the precision of 20-20 hindsight the measure
of force to be used.”

Seagroves testified that he was bottle-feeding his sick 10-month-old son
when his side garage door was kicked in with such force that the entire
house shook, a sturdy deadbolt was dislodged and the door frame
splintered.

He said he grabbed his rifle from a closet and went to investigate. Two
of four intruders immediately fled, according to Seagroves.

But the other two charged at him, putting him in fear for his life and
that of his child, he said.
It was then that Seagroves opened fire, defense evidence indicated.

Duke University psychiatrist John S. March testified that, based on his
findings, Seagroves was at 9.9 on a 1-to-10 scale in terms of terror.
He said the incident threw Seagroves into an “immediate acute stress
disorder.”

Seagroves acted on “pure reflex,” pulling the trigger in a muddle of
confusion and fear, the psychiatrist added.